



Chris Dalton | Chief Executive Officer

Level 7, 14 Martin Place, Sydney NSW 2000

M +61 (0)403 584 600

E cdalton@securitisation.com.au

www.securitisation.com.au

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Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
European Commission
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel
Belgium

By email: fisma-securitisation-review@ec.europa.eu

Targeted consultation on the functioning of the EU Securitisation Framework

On behalf of the Australian Securitisation Forum (ASF) and its members, we are writing in response to the EU targeted consultation on the functioning of the EU Securitisation Framework (Consultation). The ASF supports the responses to the Consultation made by the Association for Financial Markets (AFME) and by the US Structured Finance Association (SFA) which are fully aligned on the issues specifically outlined in the responses to the Consultation as set out in Annex 1 to this letter.

Australian Securitisation Forum

The ASF is the peak body representing the securitisation industry in Australia and New Zealand. The ASF's role is to promote the development of securitisation in Australia and New Zealand by facilitating the formation of industry positions on policy and market matters, representing the industry to local and global policymakers and regulators and advancing the professional standards of the industry through education and market outreach opportunities. The ASF is comprised of a National Committee, specific subcommittees and a national membership of over 150 organisations.

European investment in the Australian securitisation market

Australian securitisation issuers have actively engaged and established relationships with EU investors over the last 20+ years, educating investors about the Australian legal framework and the quality and performance of the underlying Australian asset portfolios. Since the implementation of the EU Securitisation Regulation, Australian securitisation issuers have taken proactive steps to assist EU investors to comply with the EU Securitisation Regulation (e.g. Article 5) when investing in Australian established securitisations. This has included the provision of granular information on Australian issuer portfolios even when differences in Australian lending products make it practically impossible to adhere to ESMA reporting templates.

EU investor participation has become progressively more important to the Australian securitisation market by expanding the suite of services it provides to both Australian domiciled issuers/originators and also to the European regulated institutions who have established

Australian businesses. Services include wholesale financing (warehousing) to Australian banks and non-bank lenders, direct investments in Australian public residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and asset backed securities (ABS) transactions, cross currency and other hedging solutions for Australian public RMBS and ABS and primary market structuring and distribution of Australian RMBS.

You will appreciate that the Australian securitisation market is well regulated by its central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) - the prudential regulator - and by the Australian Securities and Investments Commissions (ASIC) - the financial services licensing body and conduct regulator. As a well-regulated market, there are well developed and pragmatic protections in place for both issuers and investors in the Australian securitisation market.

In summary, European banks and investors perform a pivotal role in the Australian securitisation market by providing competition to the incumbent major Australian banks through additional funding capacity and investment, secondary trading and swap products. These services add value to both the EU and Australian financial systems. The ASF believes that the EU Securitisation Framework should aim to provide a measured approach to regulatory intervention while ensuring the continued growth of EU investment in the Australian securitisation market.

Size of the Australian securitisation market

According to the [latest release](#) from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, as at 30 June 2021, total assets outstanding for Australian securitisers were A\$119.8 billion. In 2019 and 2020 public market issuance volumes were approximately A\$46 billion across 55 deals and approximately A\$34 billion across 52 deals respectively. As of June 2021, there were more than A\$1.95 trillion (GBP1.04 trillion) of home loans outstanding in Australia of which around 6.2% were securitised.

This demonstrates that securitisation represents an important part of the funding requirements of Australian financiers and lenders and for the non-bank sector in Australia is the primary source of funding.

Annex 2 to this letter sets out further key Australian securitisation market statistics, including data from Standard & Poor's that reflects a highly performing RMBS market with decreasing arrears despite the existence of COVID related hardship loan deferrals in 2020-2021.

The ASF greatly appreciates your consideration of the matters in this letter including the responses to the EU targeted consultation and is more than happy to discuss them with the Commission and indeed any matter relating to the Australian securitisation market.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Chris Dalton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Chris Dalton, Chief Executive – Australian Securitisation Forum

Annex 1: Targeted consultation on the functioning of the EU Securitisation Framework

The Australian Securitisation Forum (ASF) members agree with the below responses that we understand have been submitted by the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) to the Targeted Consultation on the functioning of the EU Securitisation Framework (Consultation). In support of alignment across global securitisation industries, the ASF understands that the US Structured Finance Association is submitting a similar response. We welcome the opportunity to respond to the Consultation and would be happy to answer any further questions that you may have.

1. Effects of the regulation						
1.1. Has the Securitisation Regulation (SECR) been successful in achieving the following objectives:						
	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Neutral	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree	No opinion
Improving access to credit for the real economy, in particular for SMEs						✓
Widening the investor base for securitisation products in the EU				✓		
Widening the issuer base for securitisation products				✓		
Providing a clear legal framework for the EU securitisation market				✓		
Facilitating the monitoring of possible risks						✓
Providing a high level of		✓				

investor protection						
Emergence of an integrated EU securitisation market						✓

1.2. If you answered ‘somewhat disagree’ or ‘fully disagree’ to any of the objectives listed in the previous question, please specify the main obstacles you see to the achievement of that objective.

Market access

We support the AFME response on this point.

Another broad thematic challenge that needs to be addressed in the context of the Article 46 Review is that of market access. Consideration will need to be given to the fact that most publicly placed EU securitisations will require access to investors in third countries such as the UK, US or those in the APAC region. The result is that public securitisations, even where the sell-side entities are entirely based in the EU, will often need to consider and (to some degree) comply with the requirements of those third countries.

That is not to say that the EU should necessarily seek alignment in all areas with the rules in those jurisdictions, but considerable weight should be attached to the interoperability of the regimes such that EU entities seeking access to investors in other markets will not have unnecessary burdens imposed on them by having to comply with multiple regulatory regimes.

Likewise, EU investors seeking to invest in third country securitisations need mirroring flexibility of their own.

The broader point is that consideration of EU rules cannot be done in a vacuum, because the reality of operating in a global capital market is that EU market participants will frequently have to consider third countries' regulations (mainly those of the UK and US) even where those regulations do not directly apply to them.

Widening the investor base for securitisation products in the EU

We support the AFME response on this point.

The main effect of the SECR on investors in securitisation is to implement wide-ranging, detailed, and onerous due diligence requirements that require investors to verify a number of matters, some of which they would not otherwise be concerned with. These detailed diligence requirements, which are unique to securitisation (and for which there is no equivalent in respect of much riskier investments such as, for example, equity investment in emerging markets) represent significant barriers to entry. This partially explains the reduction in investor base for securitisation products over the years since the introduction of the SECR.

Not only are new investors discouraged from entering the market, but also some existing investors have exited the market or reduced their allocation, to securitisation

partly in response to both (i) the substantive outcomes of these new regulations; and (ii) the prudential regulatory incentives mentioned above. We would also stress that the complexity of the regime has discouraged investors – and in particular small and mid-size investors – from entering the market, even where their sophistication would otherwise make securitisation investments appropriate. This concentrates the investor base even further.

We would also point out that in the context of EU investor access to third country securitisations, the uncertainty around the application of Article 5(1)(e) to third country securitisations has adversely impacted the availability of such products to the EU investor base. This point is discussed in more detail in our response to 4.4 below.

Widening the issuer base for securitisation products

The uncertainty around the application of Article 5(1)(e) to third country securitisations has adversely impacted the available third country issuer base for EU investors. This point is discussed in more detail in our response to 4.4 below.

Providing a clear legal framework for the EU securitisation market

We support the AFME response on this point.

Significant legal questions remain unresolved and unclear or in a state of uncertainty. By way of example, these include the due diligence requirements on institutional investors under Article 5(1)(e) when investing in non-EU securitisations. This point is discussed in more detail in our response to 4.4 below.

Providing a high level of investor protection

We support the AFME response on this point.

Undoubtedly the SECR regime provides a high level of investor protection for retail clients, because Article 3 SECR imposes significant limitations on the ability to sell securitisations to this investor base. We support the restrictions in Article 3 and are not aware of any securitisations being sold to retail clients in the EU in recent years.

The 5% risk retention requirement is a core aspect of the investor protection framework which AFME supports.

The SECR regime also provides a high level of investor protection for institutional investors, but we consider that in some cases this level of protection is not appropriately calibrated in that it imposes costs that are disproportionate to the benefits of the protections conferred once account is taken of institutional investors' significantly greater potential to protect themselves via due diligence and independent credit analysis.

The requirements for extensive disclosure under Article 7, for risk retention under Article 6, relating to the choice of underlying assets (adverse selection rules in Article 6(2) and rules relating to credit granting criteria in Article 9) and the ban on re-securitisation under Article 8 all provide protection which as a whole reduces risk. The same is true with the detailed diligence requirements under Article 5.

However, we believe that these reductions in risk are not achieved in a proportionate manner. The purpose of financial markets is to allocate risk efficiently by appropriately remunerating those willing and able to take risks. The purpose of financial legislation should be to ensure an efficient market with appropriate incentives for good behaviour so that market participants can make well-informed decisions, not to eliminate risk entirely.

In particular, we support AFME's suggestion of a principles-based, proportionate approach to investor protections (rather than the current formal and prescriptive transparency and reporting requirements) such that:

- Ensuring investing in securitisation markets is limited to professional investors capable of understanding securitisation investments and absorbing credit losses to the extent that risks are realised. This is largely already achieved by the restrictions in Article 3 SECR.
- Ensuring EU sell-side (including third country originators, sponsors and issuers) entities supply appropriate information on the securitisation structure and underlying exposures (including asset selection criteria) to permit investors to undertake a well-informed analysis of their prospective investment at a level of granularity appropriate to the transaction and the underlying assets. Our view is that this point is particularly appropriate for third country transactions which already provide an appropriate and proportionate level of information to enable a sophisticated investor to carry out sufficient due diligence. We do not think it makes sense to prevent a sophisticated EU investor from investing in a third country transaction simply because that transaction does not provide the same level of reporting as the SECR Article 7 disclosure requirements and does not provide granular loan level information.
- Investors are required to undertake a level of diligence appropriate to the size, jurisdiction, risk and tenor of their exposure, and document their due diligence process accordingly. In the context of third country (non-EU) securitisations, EU institutional investors should be able to carry out proportionate due diligence and should be able to give appropriate consideration to the information made available to them in compliance with applicable third country regulatory regime and/or applicable third country market practice. The imposition of stricter and less proportionate due diligence requirements, such as mandatory EU template-based loan-level data reporting, would prevent EU institutional investors from investing in well-developed and well-established third country securitisation markets which impacts on the ability of the EU investors to diversify their investment portfolios, which leads to geographical concentration risks and less liquid securitisation markets, pushing EU institutional investors' lending into less regulated forms of financing. In this regard we fully support the Capital Markets Union High Level Forum's (CMU HLF) report's recommendation to introduce more flexibility to the SECR framework as regards institutional investors' verifications. Specifically, we support the CMU HLF's recommendation to allow an EU-regulated investors in third country securitisations to determine whether it has received sufficient information to meet the requirements of Article 5 to carry out its due diligence obligation proportionate to the risk profile of such securitisation.

3. Due diligence

The transparency regime in the SECR requires that the originator, sponsor and SSPE of a securitisation make a range of information available to the holders of the position, to competent authorities and, upon request, to potential investors. The information is provided via templates and is intended to enhance the transparency of the securitisation market as well as to facilitate investors' due diligence and the supervision of the market. The following questions aim to find out whether the information that is currently provided to investors is appropriate, sufficient and proportionate for their due diligence purposes and whether any improvements can be made.

3.1. Do you consider the current due diligence and transparency regime proportionate?

Yes

No

No opinion

Please explain your answer.

We support the AFME response on this point, particularly in relation to third country securitisations. We also support AFME submissions that identified concerns and issues that arise as a result of the lack of coordination between the application of the SECR regime and other EU regulatory regimes, such as the Prospectus Regulation in relation to the requirement that overlap with the SECR requirements relating to the disclosure of the core transaction documents.

There are some benefits, but for the reasons set out above, we do not believe that the regimes are proportionate. The disproportionality is much more acute for private securitisations than for public securitisations, but it exists in both cases. See above for detail on private securitisations. If Article 5(1)(e) were to be interpreted restrictively to require full EU-style disclosure from non-EU sell-side entities then that would be especially disproportionate. Please see our response to 4.4 below.

On public securitisations, the disproportionality comes mainly in four forms:

- Due diligence obligations in relation to third country securitisations: This is especially problematic with respect to Article 5(1)(e) and could be resolved by a more flexible and proportionate application of the requirement to conduct regulatory due diligence. This would ensure EU investors can invest on a level playing field with third country investors and help them to optimise their risk: return ratio by diversifying geographically while ensuring they take appropriate measures to understand the investments they are making.
- Loan-level data: This data is not required in order to make a well-informed investment decision in respect of securitisations of highly granular asset classes.
 - o By way of example, for credit card securitisations pool-level characteristics, trends and statistics are far more useful than any information about the (very small) individual receivables making up the pool, as the former will help an investor understand the key parameters affecting their investment over time (e.g. excess spread and payment rate). The latter, on the other hand, will necessarily be out of date by the time data can be reported (due to the short-

term and revolving nature of the underlying receivables) and in any case data on any individual receivable does not materially affect the credit performance of the overall pool.

- Similar arguments apply to trade receivables. They do not bear interest and their maturities are normally 45 days or less. The originators are not in the business of creating and managing credit risk. The originators make products or provide services and the credit risk associated with the trade receivables is ancillary to their core activity and ordinary course of business. Hence there is no bank-like credit analysis or credit process or credit rating by the originator for these receivables (which is not to say that there is no analysis at all). They are often insured by a trade credit insurer. The obligors are often SMEs and therefore, particularly in Europe, lack a public rating.
- In summary, we would suggest eliminating the requirement for loan-level data for securitisations featuring short-term, highly granular or revolving assets. As set out above, this will almost always include securitisations of credit card and trade receivables but may well also apply to other asset classes depending on the specifics of the deal. On the other hand, loan-level data requirements should be kept in place for securitisations of larger, less granular assets classes where loan-by-loan information is required to assess the risks of the asset pool.
- Inappropriate templated data requirements: these are not only a problem for public securitisations, but the content of the disclosure templates is often not appropriate to the economics of the transactions.
 - The most egregious example of this is perhaps trade receivables, where the template designated for use (Annex IX) is so poorly adapted that the Joint Committee of the ESAs has already acknowledged in its Article 44 review report that a whole new reporting template may be required. We support the elimination of loan-level data requirements for trade receivables in any case, but if the loan-level requirement is to be retained then we would support the implementation of this recommendation for a new, simplified trade receivables template.
 - There are other instances where templates may simply not be sufficiently flexible to be meaningfully completed. For example, certain mortgage loans can be connected to both commercial and residential properties (e.g. a shopkeeper who lives above their shop). In this case, the originator would have to choose between the RMBS and CMBS template, but both are likely to include irrelevant information the originator would not otherwise collect (and where the fields may require information that may not make sense in the circumstances) and which would have limited availability of ND options to provide the required flexibility.

The benefits of current market practices (which are due only in part to the SECR regime) include ensuring that a broader range of investors conduct proper diligence both before investing and in an ongoing manner. In this sense it may have contributed to a more professional and robust securitisation market that is better able to price and manage credit risk. The first real test of this has been the COVID-19 pandemic, which has so far caused no widespread forced selling in the securitisation market and credit spreads have moved largely in line with other fixed income

markets. However, these benefits have, we believe, been achieved at the cost of creating barriers to entry so high that the volume of transactions (and therefore the volume of finance provided to the real economy via securitisation) has been much lower than it otherwise could have been. It may thereby have pushed more funds into less regulated forms of financing such as direct lending from funds.

4. Jurisdictional scope

The Joint Committee of the ESAs issued an opinion to the Commission on the jurisdictional scope of the Securitisation Regulation, identifying some elements of the legal text that require clarification. This section of the questionnaire seek feedback on the issues identified by the Joint Committee.

4.1. Have you experienced problems related to a lack of clarity of the Securitisation Regulation pertaining to its jurisdictional scope?

Yes

No

No opinion

Please explain your answer.

We support the AFME response on this point.

An important initial problem with the SECR as to jurisdictional scope was determining what entities were in- and out-of-scope. The market has since settled on an interpretation that broadly consists of an approach whereby an entity is in-scope if it has a supervisor appointed under Article 29 SECR and otherwise out-of-scope. It would, however, be useful for this to be confirmed by authorities. Another key problem has been the lack of clarity around the interpretation of Article 5(1)(e) as it applies to investments in third country securitisations. Please see our response to 4.4 below.

4.2. Where non-EU entities are involved, should additional requirements (such as EU establishment/presence) for those entities be introduced to facilitate the supervision of the transaction?

Yes

No

No opinion

Please explain your answer.

We support the AFME response on this point.

We feel strongly that additional requirements would be unnecessary and create additional costly and onerous barriers to participation in the market that are not justified by improvements to market functioning or safety. They would tend to reduce the number of non-EU securitisations sold to EU investors thereby increasing geographic concentration risk, reducing liquidity and market depth and creating conditions for increased volatility. EU investors in any case report all of their investments to their own supervisors, so the supervision of EU investors is already assured, regardless of the origin of the transaction.

4.4. Should the current verification duty for institutional investors laid out in Article 5(1)(e) of the SECR be revised to add more flexibility the framework?

Yes

No

No opinion

Please explain your answer.

We refer to our comments made in 1.2 above, in particular our feedback supporting the CMU HLF report's recommendation to introduce more flexibility to the SECR framework as regards institutional investors' verifications. Specifically, we support the CMU HLF's recommendation to allow an EU-regulated investors in third country securitisations to determine whether it has received sufficient information to meet the requirements of Article 5 to carry out its due diligence obligation proportionate to the risk profile of such securitisation.

We also support the AFME response on this point, particularly in relation to third country securitisations.

Regarding section 1.2.2 of the JSA Opinion on Article 5(1)(e), we agree that either interpretative guidance or further legislation would be helpful here as this has caused some issues for the market. However, we have significant concerns about the impact of the conclusions reached in this section. The articulation of the law as it currently stands in the JSA Opinion is at variance with the understanding of many market participants and it is unclear how the ESAs have come to the conclusion they appear to have reached. It is disappointing that the JSA Opinion does not take account of the difficulty in interpreting and applying Article 5(1)(e) or the market practice developed over the more than two years since market participants first requested guidance on this point. Nor do they appear to have taken account of the considerable difficulties EU institutional investors have had obtaining Article 7 information when investing in third country securitisations. The JSA Opinion is also at odds with the recommendations of the CMU HLF report that Article 5(1)(e) should not apply to third country transactions and that a "proportionate" approach should be considered instead.

This is necessary in particular for EU banks acting through their third country branches or subsidiaries as investors, originators or sponsors of securitisations (including sponsors of ABCP conduits) in connection with third country securitisations with, for example, non-EU originators and/or SSPEs to avoid creating an unlevel playing field when offering asset-backed lending solutions to their clients. If EU banks are required to obtain SECR-style templated information from their clients, this will put them at a significant competitive disadvantage as compared to their non-EU competitors for those same clients' business.

EU banks and their affiliates investing in third country securitisation lending transactions typically perform a prudent, risk-based assessment of the transactions they are entering into, and already typically receive asset-level data which is sufficient for determining whether their lending criteria have been satisfied before entering into a transaction and on an ongoing basis post-closing. However, this information may be in a format different from the ESMA templates, e.g. in the form of a loan tape. Providing the information specifically in the form of the ESMA templates, or providing additional information or data fields which are not produced

or used by that originator in its business (including due to the region specifics – e.g. lack of LEI or NACE codes for non-EU entities/industries), would represent a considerable additional administrative and reporting burden for such originators. Non-EU originators are unlikely to make an investment in their information technology systems solely to satisfy an EU bank or affiliate where funding is otherwise available from other investors, such as non-EU banks. If the wording were to be clarified to require reporting specifically in the form of the ESMA templates, or to require provision of information corresponding to all the data fields in those templates, this will clearly put EU banks and their affiliates at a significant competitive disadvantage and will greatly diminish their ability to compete in and participate in this market.

It is also important to note that investors in these transactions are typically quite involved in structuring the transactions and would typically review and actively negotiate their terms. Each initial and subsequent investor may have the ability to carry out due diligence before investing in the transaction, receive requested information, both initially and on an ongoing basis, and ask questions from the originator's and/or the servicer's management, in each case either directly or through participation in a syndicate of investors via an agent. This is in contrast to a transaction where the initial information in relation to the transaction is limited to a "take it or leave it" form of offering memorandum or other disclosure document. The lenders generally have the opportunity to carry out due diligence, liaising directly with the originator or through an agent for the lenders, and to consider asset-level data. These transactions are typically structured to extremely high credit standards and monitored diligently.

We do not believe that a third country equivalence regime with the requirements suggested by the ESAs would provide meaningful flexibility; indeed it would almost certainly put EU institutional investors at a disadvantage by needlessly limiting their investment options. Even the most advanced securitisation markets outside the EU (other than possibly the UK) lack reporting requirements imposed by law that are comparable to those in the EU. They would therefore likely fail to qualify as "equivalent" under the framework suggested by the ESAs – functionally eliminating the ability of EU investors to make appropriate, measured judgments designed to maximise and diversify their returns and those of their stakeholders.

It would be much more sensible to apply the concept of proportionality of due diligence (in line with the recommendation made in the Final Report of the High Level Forum on the Capital Markets Union of 10 June 2020) to permit EU investors to judge whether they had received sufficient information (including information contractually promised to be provided on an ongoing basis) to make an informed judgment about the risks of taking an investment decision, as they do with virtually every other asset class other than securitisation. This would permit EU investors to make a reasoned judgment in cases e.g. where it is simply not practically possible to provide the exact same information as required under the EU regime, due to jurisdiction-specific features of the assets, jurisdictional differences in legislation or terminology. Needless to say, we also do not believe that it is sensible or proportionate to require any disclosure in respect of third country securitisations to be reported via a securitisation repository, not least because requiring such reporting to be done via an EU-authorized securitisation repository this will often breach contractual obligations or local laws on confidentiality of information and requiring such reporting to be done in a third country via an "equivalent" to a securitisation repository mechanism will not be achievable in practice in most cases, and would

therefore risk leading to exclusion of EU investors from transactions in order to avoid these outcomes. This policy position is already recognised by EU law, in the form of recital (13) and Article 7(2) of SECR.

Given the strong misgivings we have expressed above regarding the conclusions reached in the JSA Opinion we urge the Commission and the ESAs to reconsider. The ASF and its members would be willing to engage constructively with the Commission and the ESAs to assist with this process, and to help resolve any underlying concerns. However, if the Commission and ESAs decide to proceed as outlined in the JSA Opinion (which we strongly oppose), then given the potentially significant implications for existing investments in third country securitisations, we stress that in advance of publication of any further commentary, interpretative guidance or legislative proposals, the ESAs should consider the implications and put in place any grandfathering required for EU investors with existing third country securitisation positions.


If you answered ‘Yes’ to question 4.4, how can it be ensured that the ultimate objective of protecting EU institutional investors remains intact?

We support the AFME response on this point.


Even with our proposed revisions, we believe that the objective of protecting EU institutional investors would remain intact. We continue to support the Article 5 legal obligation for institutional investors to undertake due diligence – an obligation which is unique to securitisation. It should also be noted that the overall framework also provides other safeguards which address lessons learned from the GFC such as avoiding over-reliance on credit ratings. Lastly it should be noted that all investment carries risk and the policy objective should not be to seek to exclude it altogether. The question is where the balance should be struck which is why we believe a more proportionate approach is appropriate.

Annex 2: Statistical overview of Australian securitisation market


RMBS & ABS Issuance (2011 – 2021)



RMBS & ABS Outstandings (2011 – 2021)



Prime RMBS Arrears (2011 – 2021)



Sources: National Australia Bank, Bloomberg, Standard & Poor's